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John Rawls, A Theory of Justice The Role of
Justice Each
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice
that even the welfare of a society as a whole cannot
override. For
this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom
for some is made right by a greater good shared by
others. The
rights secured by justice are not subject to political
bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. Let
us assume … society … an agreement on the proper
division of shares. The Main Idea of
the Theory of Justice Social
contract theory The
“original agreement”:
They are the principles that free and rational
person concerned to further their own interests would
accept in an initial position of equality as defining
the fundamental terms of their association. Justice as
fairness. Men
are to decide in advance how they are to regulate
their claims against one another…. The choice
which rational men would make in this hypothetical
situation of equal liberty. State
of nature: but
in the original position, no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does
any one know his fortune in the distribution of
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,
strength, and the like. The
principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance… [so
that] no one is able to design principles to favor his
particular condition, [thus] the principles of justice
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. An initial
condition that is fair.
(Note: For Hobbes, the original equality meant
war. “Fairness”
only came about because of the sovereign. Not so
here.) Note: What they
are choosing is the first principles of a conception
of justice which is to regulate all subsequent
criticism and reform of institutions. We choose a
conception of justice to by which to govern ourselves
(meaning us all together as a society: before that,
who knows?) These
are the principles [argues Rawls] that free and equal
persons would
assent to under circumstances that are fair. [From whence
this notion of “fair”?]
In this sense its members are autonomous and
the obligations they recognize are self-imposed.
[Kant] Rational,
autonomous, self-interested (largely not interested in
the interests of others), effectiveness maximizers. The
Two Principles: (1) The first requires
equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties. (2) The second holds
that the social and economic inequalities, for example
inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if
they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and
in particular for the least advantaged members of
society. The Original
Position and Justification It
seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one
should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural
fortune or social circumstances in the choice of
principles. It
also seems widely agreed that it should be impossible
to tailor principles to the circumstances of one’s own
case. We
should insure further that particular inclinations and
aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good do
not affect the principles adopted. One
excludes the knowledge of those contingencies which
sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their
prejudices. In
this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a
natural way. [?] “Reflective
equilibrium”: We
can check an interpretation of the initial situation
by the capacity of its principles to accommodate our
firmest convictions and to provide guidance where
guidance is needed.
Our principles and judgments coincide. These
constraints express what we are prepared to regard as
limits on fair terms of social cooperation. Classical
Utilitarianism Why
not utilitarianism?
Individuals balance losses against gains. Why should
not a society act on precisely the same principle? A society is
properly arranged when its institutions maximize the
net balance of satisfaction. The
principle of choice for an association of men is
interpreted as an extension of the principle of choice
for one man. Social
justice is the principle of rational prudence applied
to an aggregative conception of the welfare of the
group. The
right and the good:
commonly, the good is defined independently
from the right, and then the right is defined as that
which maximizes the good. “Do what
leads to the most good.” Given
the utilitarian view of justice, it does not matter,
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is
distributed among individuals any more than it
matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes
his satisfactions over time. There
may be certain precepts which experience shows should
be strictly respected and departed from only under
exceptional circumstances. [“fundamental right”;
“strict scrutiny”; “compelling state interest” vs.
rational basis test] And
yet there is no reason in principle why the greatest
gains of some should not compensate for the lesser
losses of others; or more importantly, why the
violation of the liberty of a few might not be made
right by the greater good shared by the many. The
role of the “impartial spectator”: It is this
spectator who is conceived as carrying out the
required organization of the desires of all persons
into one coherent system of desire; it is by this
construction that many persons are fused into one. Endowed with
ideal powers of sympathy and imagination, the
impartial spectator is the perfectly rational
individual who identifies with and experiences the
desires of others as if these desires were his own. In this way
he ascertains the intensity of these desires and
assigns them their appropriate weight in the one
system …. The
key: efficient
administration for maximizing interests. This
view of social cooperation is the consequence of
extending to society the principle of choice for one
man, and then, to make this extension work, conflating
all persons into one through the imaginative acts of
the impartial sympathetic spectator. Utilitarianism
does not take seriously the distinction between
persons. [Question: Does Rawls?] Some Related
Contrasts The
issue of “rights”:
Justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The
reasoning which balances the gains and losses of
different persons as if they were one person is
excluded. Justice
as fairness attempts to account for these common sense
convictions. [Uh-oh, if we’re going to make an appeal
to “common sense convictions.”] Utilitarianism
is not individualistic:
it subjects the rights secured by justice to
the calculus of social interests (as determined by
some “efficient administrator” who is serving
supposedly in the capacity of “impartial spectator.” For
utilitarians (at least of a certain sort), the
satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself
which must be taken into account in deciding what is
right. In
calculating the greatest balance of satisfaction it
does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires
are for. We
are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the
greatest sum of satisfactions; we ask no questions
about their source or quality but only how their
satisfaction would affect the total well-being. Thus if men
take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one
another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a
means of enhancing their self-respect [and they do],
then the satisfaction of these desires [it seems] must
be weighed in our deliberations according to their
intensity, etc. along with other desires. The
principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on
which satisfactions have value; they impose
restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of
one’s good. The
priority of the right over the good in justice as
fairness turns out to be a central feature of the
conception. Certain
initial bonds are placed upon what is good and what
forms of character are morally worthy, and so upon
what kinds of persons men should be. Two Principles of
Justice (the two that would be chosen in the
“initial position” behind the “veil of ignorance” by
rational persons) (1) First, each person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. (2) Second, social and
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all. Injustice,
then, is simply inequalities that are not to the
benefit of all…. Interpretations
of
the Second Principle One
statement of “the second principle” is
this: “The
second holds that the social
and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of
wealth and authority,
are just only if they result in compensating benefits
for everyone, and in
particular for the least advantaged members of
society.” The
most recent is this:
social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected
to be to everyone’s
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices
open to all. Note
the two principles:
“equally open” and to “everyone’s advantage.” But note
also, in the earlier
formulation:
“in particular for the
least advantaged members of society.” Question:
What would happen if you arranged the system so
that “careers are open
to talents”? The
better prepared would get
ahead. Are
we to accept the “initial
distribution of assets” as itself “fair”?
If not, what do we do? NB:
The most obvious injustice of the system of
natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares
to be improperly
influenced by these factors [factors such as natural
talents and abilities as
these have been developed or left unrealized and their
use favored or
disfavored over time and such chance contingencies as
accident and good
fortune] so arbitrary from a moral point of view This is where Nozick is going to pounce! The
school system, whether public or private, should
be designed to even out class barriers.
[and educate?] There
is no more reason to permit the distribution
of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution
of natural assets
[talent, knowledge, etc.] than by historical and
social fortune. NB: Furthermore,
the principle of fair opportunity can be only
imperfectly carried out, at least
as long as the institution of the family exists. Even
the willingness to make an effort, to try, and
so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself
dependent upon happy family
and social circumstances. It
is impossible in practice to secure equal chances
of achievement and culture for those similarly
endowed, and therefore we may
want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact
and also mitigates the arbitrary
effects of the natural
lottery. The
advantages of persons with great natural endowments
are to be limited to those that further the good of
the poorer sectors of
society. Democratic
Equality
and the Difference Principle Assuming
the framework of institutions required by
equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the
higher expectations of
those better situated are just if and only if [but
note, the greater
expectations will be just] they work as part of a
scheme which improves the
expectations of the least advantaged members of
society. The
Tendency to Equality The
principle of redress:
the principle that undeserved inequalities
call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and
natural endowment are
undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow
compensated for. [Remember,
these are the conditions Rawls thinks the only ones
“rational people” would
agree to in the “original position.” Are
they?] To
provide genuine equality of opportunity, society
must give more attention to those with fewer native
assets and to those born
into the less favorable social positions.
[e.g., affirmative action] Those
who have been favored by nature, whoever they
are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms
that improve the situation
of those who have lost out. The
naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because
they are more gifted …. No
one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a
more favorable starting
place in society. The
Veil of Ignorance No
one [in the original position] knows his place in
society, his class position or social status; nor does
he know his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and
strength, and the like, nor his conception of the
good, the particulars of his
rational plan of life, or even the special features of
his psychology such as
his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or
pessimism.
Nor any of the particulars of the society he
will be born into.
Complete ignorance of
details: What
system, then, would
rational person agree to? Answer
(thinks
Rawls): The
system of justice as
fairness he has outlined. Legitimate
Expectations
and Moral Desert There
is a tendency for common sense to suppose that
income and wealth, and the good things in life
generally, should be distributed
according to moral desert. Justice is
happiness according to virtue. Justice
as fairness rejects this conception.
Such a principle would not be chosen in the
original position. Now to Robert
Nozick! |