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Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia Natural Assets and Arbitrariness In a
standard market economy,
income and wealth will be distributed in an efficient way,
and that the
particular efficient distribution which results in any
period time is
determined by initial distribution of income and wealth,
and of natural talents
and abilities. If
we are to accept the
outcome as just, and not merely as efficient, we must
accept the basis upon
which over time the initial distribution of assets is
determined. In the
system of natural liberty
the initial distribution is regulated by the arrangements
implicit in the
conception of careers open to talents. NB:
“factors so arbitrary from a
moral point of view. What is
left out? There
is no mention at all of how persons have chosen to develop
their own natural
assets. Why
nothing on this? What view
is presupposed of
character and its relation to actions? This line
of argument can
succeed in blocking the introduction of a person’s
autonomous choices and
actions (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person
completely to certain sorts
of “external” factors.
So denigrating a
person’s autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions
is a risky line to
take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the
dignity and
self-respect of autonomous beings; especially for a theory
that founds so much
(including the theory of the good) upon persons’ choices.
Why
shouldn’t holdings partially
depend upon natural endowments? Rawls’
reply is that these
natural endowments and assets, being undeserved, are
“arbitrary from a moral
point of view.” Two ways to
understand the
relevance of this reply. (1) It
might be part of an
argument to establish that the distributive effects of
natural differences
ought to be nullified: the positive argument [But should the distributive effects of natural
differences be
nullified?] (2) It
might be part of an
argument to rebut a possible counterargument holding that
the distributive effects
of natural differences oughtn’t to be nullified: the
negative argument [Person
A says: the distributive effects of natural difference
oughtn’t be nullified;
Rawls replies: No, your argument is wrong, so the distributive effects of natural differences
should be nullified,
as I concluded above. The Positive Argument Are
differences always a bad
thing? How do
they arise? What
ends to they serve? The Negative Argument Whether or
not people’s natural
assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are
entitled to them.
[Note: if nothing of moral significance could flow from
what was arbitrary,
then no particular person’s existence could be of moral
significance.] We have
found no cogent argument
to (help) establish that differences in holding arising
from differences in
natural assets should be eliminated or minimized. Collective Assets Rawls’s
view seems to be that
everyone has some entitlement or claim on the totality of
natural assets
(viewed as a pool), with no one having differential
claims. This
distribution of natural abilities is
viewed as a “collective asset.” “Those who
have been favored by
nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune
only on terms that
improve the situation of those who have lost out ... No
one deserves his
greater natural capacity....
But it does
not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another
way to deal with them.
The basic structure can be arranged so that
these contingencies work for the good of the least
fortunate. See humorous
comic. Does Rawls’
view take seriously
(enough) the distinctions between persons; and does it
violate Kant’s principle
forbidding us to treat people’s abilities and talents as
resources for others? Point of
chapter: To consider
the claim that a state more extensive than the minimal
state could be justified
on the grounds that it was necessary, or the most
appropriate instrument, to
achieve distributive justice. According o
the entitlement
conception of justice in holdings, there is no argument
based upon the first
two principles of distributive justice, the principles of
acquisition and of
transfer, for such a more extensive state.
However,
there is a possibility
of rectification
of past injustices. |