Matthew of Aquasparta (ca. 1240-29 Oct. 1302), of the noble Bentivenghi family, Aquasparta, Italy, patrons of the convent of S. Fortunato in nearby Todi, where he entered the Franciscan Order about 1260. There he doubtless met Benedict Caetani (later Pope Boniface VIII) who in 1260 became canon of the Cathedral under his uncle Peter, Bishop of Todi, and Jacomo de’ Benedetti, prominent poet who, after his wife died, became Fra Jacopone da Todi.

He was sent to the University of Paris about 1268, just as Franciscans were attacked by secular Masters of Theology, such as Gerard of Abbeville, who rejected their way of life, and by radical Aristotelians in the Faculty of Arts, such as Siger of Brabant. Matthew took inspiration from Bonaventure, Minister General of the Order (1257-1273), who defended mendicancy in *Apologia pauperum* (1269) and set Aristotle in his proper place in *Collationes in Hexaemeron* (Spring, 1273). A second inspiration was John Pecham, holder of the Franciscan Chair of Theology (ca. 1269-1271) and leader of Bonaventure’s feisty lieutenants. Pecham criticized the Aristotelianism of Aquinas, as did William de la Mare, who held the Franciscan Chair (ca. 1273-1276) and wrote a *Correctorium fratris Thomae* in 1279. Matthew learned the rhetoric of moderation from Bonaventure and more conservative practice from Pecham.

Matthew studied in Paris ca. 1268-1273, his *Commentum in sententiis* is still unedited. A tract written before the Council of Lyons (1274) is noteworthy for saying “the plenitude of power resides in the Roman Pontiff” (1957a: 424.20). He probably incepted as Master of Theology in 1273, with a *principium* on the science of theology. Its conception of authority underlies his whole career. The “utility” of theology comes from its end–beatitude; its “faculty” comes from its matter–God’s law. The “authority of the Master” comes from “the God of glory and majesty”, theology’s “special (praecipuus) teacher”. Inner illumination “is rendered authentic and confirmed” through God’s “prodigious deeds of nature [studied in philosophy] and grace [as seen in Scripture]”; through special inspiration; and tradition. Hence the authority of Masters, Bishops, Popes. Finally, there are three “conditions” for the theologian becoming a “disciple”: “First the disciple must enter the school and humbly subject himself to the Master, not contradict what he hears but piously and faithfully assent to it, for this is the loftiest
doctrine”; second, “fervently desiring and through desire diligently investigating” this doctrine; and finally achieving “purity of vision and tranquillity of mind” (1957a: 22-8). This humility led Matthew to embrace a well-developed Franciscan tradition and to be suspicious of change, “for from intellectual pride come all errors, all eccentric opinions, all impious and profane innovations” (1962b: 41).

Matthew taught at Bologna and Paris before his appointment to the studium of the papal curia (1279-1287), where he succeeded Pecham, who was made Archbishop of Canterbury on 28 Jan. 1279. Since a notary’s record places “Br. Matthew doctor in theology” at Bologna in August, 1273, just before the beginning of the academic year (1956: 6*), it is likely that he first taught in Bologna (ca. 1273-1277), then at Paris (ca. 1277-1279), in the aftermath of the condemnation of 7 March 1277. His scholarly life ended in May, 1287, when he was elected Minister General at the Franciscan General Chapter in Montpellier.

The literary record from Bologna is sparse, as befits a first appointment. Bits of “a question disputed at Bologna” about God are preserved (1935: lxxxvi). De anima 1-13 may well come from Bologna, since it contains no references to the condemnation of 1277 (1961: 11-12).

In De anima Matthew embraces the twin doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of substantial forms (1961: 168, 65; cf. 1957b: 180). Following these general principles, humans are composites of body and soul, “an intellectual spirit so conjoined to the body that it is the form and perfection of the body” (1961: 25). Matthew placed himself between Aquinas’s single substantial form, “the intellective or rational soul, which is the specific human form giving sensible being and vegetative being and even corporeal being” (59) and the exaggerated realism of Plato’s “three souls in one man”—the “rational” soul situated in the head, “desire” in the heart, and “nutritive” soul in the liver. His view follows “the common position of the theologians, that the soul is one in substance, having three consubstantial and connatural powers, through which it produces life, sensation, and intellectual being, so that the soul in itself totally and in all its powers is created by God, and in this creation is poured into a body formed and perfectly organized” (108). Matthew’s view requires delayed animation and a plurality of
forms to prepare the body for the infusion of the rational soul; God as efficient cause of the infused rational soul; and agent and possible intellects which are parts of the individual soul, not cosmic forces. He can agree verbally with the Thomist teaching that the soul is both “an individual substance (hoc aliquid)” and the “form and perfection of the body”.

Typical of Matthew’s approach is his argument for the immortality of the soul, based on the Dionysian hierarchy of “four grades of beings”: things that only are, that also live, and perceive, and understand. Bonaventure used this hierarchy to argue from “footprints” in the world to the existence and incorruptibility of “supercelestial things”—God and angels (Itinerarium 1.13). Matthew moves in the opposite direction. Assuming a “supreme grade of being” which “cannot be corruptible” because it is so “noble and high”, he concludes on Dionysian grounds about the human soul: “since it is intellectual, it cannot be mortal”. Demonstration of this conclusion is based on “consideration of its essence” in terms of the hierarchical structure of reality. This is not the last instance in which Matthew appeals to the Dionysian hierarchy.

The chronology of his Parisian and curial disputations is based on an autograph manuscript (Assisi 134; cf. Todi 44) where Matthew set out the texts of 21 groups of questions in what seems to be chronological order, since it intersperses ordinary and quodlibetal questions. Those he disputed as Master in Paris are: De fide qq. 1-8; De cognitione 1-10; De anima separata 1-3; Quod. I; De anima separata 4-9; De anima beata 1-8. De fide and De cognitione, which contain two offhand references to the condemnation of 7 March 1277 (1957a: 160, 203), were likely begun that Fall (1277-1278). The questions about separated souls are painstakingly structured around positions “excommunicated recently by the present lord Bishop of Paris [Étienne Tempier], following the common consensus of all the Masters” (1959: 26-7) and thus probably disputed during the following academic year (1278-1279).

Matthew returned to Paris as a man with a mission to defend Franciscan tradition in a highly polemical setting. His way of doing so can be traced in the new form taken by the “responses” of his Parisian disputations. After setting out the full range of positions on a
question, stating his own view clearly, and arguing for it, as he had previously done, Matthew invariably completes his response by appending an extended quotation from St. Augustine, one designed to legitimize what he has proven through other, often Bonaventurean, arguments. Matthew’s so-called “Augustinianism” consists in appealing to the authority of Augustine, something quite different from taking his philosophical inspiration there.

The disputed questions *De fide* and *De cognitione* are conceived as a unit to show how faith and reason operate together. *De fide* q. 1 situates the truth that humans can attain certain knowledge between the hyper-realism of the Old Academy and the skepticism of the New. The rest of *De fide* concerns certitude coming from faith. Religious belief is necessary for salvation (q. 2), which is why “the sane truth dictates and right reason confirms” that salvation is found “only in the one true faith and law of Christianity” (1957a: q. 3, 70, 78). The nature of faith is then clarified through causal analysis (qq. 3-8) and seen to be so important that one can both know and believe a given truth about God at one and the same time (1957a: q. 5, 135).

In *De cognitione* Matthew widens the argument of Bonaventure’s *De scientia Christi*, q. 4, which assumed illumination theory and asked which of its proponents had given its best account: Plato, Avicenna, or Augustine. For Matthew, the goal is to attain a mean between Plato, who held the forms are the “total and only cause of knowing” and Aristotle, who “said the whole cause of knowing comes from below, by way of sense, memory, and experience”. Under the authority of Augustine and the inspiration of Bonaventure, Matthew takes a middle position: “whatever is known with certain intellectual knowledge is known in its eternal reasons and in light of the first truth”. Exactly what is and what is not due to God he then determines with precision: “The *material* cause of knowing comes from exterior things, from where the species of the things known derive”; divine ideas do not provide the content for knowledge, which is empirical. “But the *formal* cause partly comes from within, that is, from the light of [human] reason” working through the abstractive process to produce universal concepts and judgments, “and partly it comes from above, from eternal rules and reason, but by way of completion or consummation”, where God acts as efficient cause, adding the formality of *certitude* to human
cognition. Only the certitude of knowledge comes from God (1957a: q. 2, 240), a Bonaventurean position perhaps clearer here than in Bonaventure himself.

Matthew’s disputation in 1278-1279 seem conceived to support the authority of “the common opinion of the Masters”, which the Bishop of Paris had used in the condemnation. Matthew begins oddly,qq. 1-3 of *De anima separata* are devoted to motion and separated souls, where one would expect consideration of the state of separation itself. The reason is that Matthew has his eye on the view, advocated by Aristotelians like Siger and Aquinas, that angels and separated souls are completely immaterial, which was condemned because it makes creatures too much like God.

It is the prerogative of God to move bodies at will, so in q. 1 Matthew attacks the condemned view (Hissette: 132) that angels and separated souls can do this, too. Once it has left the body, the human soul cannot act as a mover or re-enter the body on its own volition (1959: 10), because the soul can move the body only when united as its form. In qq. 2 and 3 Matthew attacks another condemned view advocated by Aquinas and Siger, that substances separated from bodies--whether angels or human souls--do not in their substance and nature exist in a place, but are only in place reductively “through operation” (Hissette: 53, 54, 55). The fundamental error here is trying to make creatures too much like God by separating them from all matter. All creatures are “contained within the single circumference of the one highest heaven”, a fact which the doctrine of universal hylomorphism embraces. Since spiritual substances contain matter, by nature they are “in place”, they “move from place to place”, and do so “successively” not instantaneously. Matthew then draws equally anti-Aristotelian conclusions about their knowledge. “A separate soul acquires knowledge from inferior things”, a view “more sane and catholic and more in concord with Sacred Scripture” than that of Aquinas (1959: q. 4, 70). As a corollary, distance impedes the knowledge separated souls can have of corporeal things (q. 5, 85). The line of argument running through these questions is designed to support the condemnation through attacking the contrary views of prominent Aristotelians.

When he turns to souls enduring the torments of hell, Matthew follows the Fathers,
contrary to Avicenna’s “completely erroneous” rejection of sensible pains in hell. The damned suffer from the sensible “fire of Gehenna” and from the even more painful “worm of conscience” within. The distinction is important, for unbaptized children suffer the absence of God only interiorly, they endure no physical suffering (1959: qq. 6-9).

In *De anima beata*, Matthew takes up the roles of intellect and will in the beatific vision. The intellect plays a subordinate, “dispositive” role, while the will is “completive” in a complex act involving both. The intellect sees the divine essence immediately, but the divine essence does not become the “form of the intellect” as Dominicans held, for so unifying the creature’s mind to God would undercut the ontological simplicity of God (1959: qq. 6-8). To get to these traditional topics, however, Matthew moves through two other issues which do arise out of the condemnation. Bishop Etienne Tempier had rightly condemned the claim “that felicity is had in this life and not in another” (Hissette: 172), because “however much [the philosophers] disputed about the end of ‘the good’, they could not attain that to which only divine authority leads” (186). A rational creature attains beatitude only in the “uncreated good” and needs a glorified body to do so (1959: qq. 1-2). There follow qq. 3-5 about equality among beatified souls, where Matthew uses angels as a metaphysical test case. Dionysus had clearly held that “among angels there is inequality” within a species, which is contrary to the Avicennian and Thomistic doctrine that each angel constitutes a unique species, a view condemned “by the whole college of the Masters of the faculty of theology” (1959: 260-1). Likewise, within the human species there is such inequality of nature that some souls enjoy more, others less beatitude and glory, a difference derived not from the body but from “their very natures”. Such inequality, far from being an embarrassment, “is right due to the multitude of forms and the form of beauty found in the city of the highest heaven” (236). Once again Dionysian hierarchy opens the way to the vision of the common good which came to preoccupy Matthew after he left Paris.

All Matthew’s other disputations were done at the curia (1279-1287). In chronological order: *De ieiunio* 1-3; *Quod. II*; *De productione rerum* 1-4; *Quod. III*; *De prod. 5-6*; *Quod. IV*; *De prod.7-9*; *De providentia* 1-4; *Quod. V*; *De prov. 5-6*; *De gratia 1-8*; *Quod. VI*; *De gratia 9-
10. Outside the chronological list: *De incarnatione* 1-9; *De legibus* 1-6; *De anima* 1-6; *De morte Christi*.

Especially important philosophically are *de productione rerum* and *de providentia*, again conceived as a unit where philosophical reason joins revelation to study God as principle and overseer of creation. “Since production presupposes a cause” Matthew begins with the existence of God, one of those common axioms known to all humans (*communis animorum conceptio*). For as soon as we hear the term God our “mind immediately conceives and so assents to his existence”. It does not follow, however, that arguments for God’s existence are useless, and Matthew distinguishes two routes such proofs can take (1956: 11).

Along the inner route he construes the ontological argument as dialectical reasoning of the sort used to defend indemonstrable first principles. What makes the proposition *God exists* axiomatic is that “the cause of the predicate is completely included in the subject”, that is, in “the definition (ratio) of ‘first and supreme being’..” He then uses a Bonaventurean formulation to clarify the ontological inference: “Just as ‘if the best is the best’, then it follows that ‘the best is’ . . . so also ‘if the first and supreme being is first and supreme being’, then it necessarily follows that ‘the first and supreme being is’, because the first and supreme being is fully actual and complete” (1956: 11-12).

The second is an exterior route divided along the broad contours of Aristotelian causality. Three avenues open up for demonstrating God’s existence from effects, since “God is efficient, formal, and final cause of creatures” (1956: 241). Two arguments use efficient causality, one taken from the origin of creatures, a second from their beginning in time. Three more arguments are taken from formal causality: one from the gradations in creatures, another from their imperfections, and a third from their mutability. Finally, two arguments use final causality, one taken from the governance of the world, and another from its order (12-18). Matthew associates each argument with a particular Christian thinker and his arguments based on formal and final causality show he learned something from Aquinas. Like Bonaventure, Matthew outlines every possible route to God, and he finds no need to choose between dialectical arguments for God’s
existence as a principle and demonstrative arguments for the same conclusion, so long as the two types of arguments are not confused.

The remaining questions concern the nature of God as creator, who must possess every formal perfection bestowed on creatures (1956: q. 2) and must be the one universal cause “of all other things” (q. 3). God must then produce things “by means of creation, or, from nothing” (q. 4). Muslim emanation is rejected because God produces creatures “immediately”, not through a co-creator, since even for God it is impossible “to communicate the power of creating to a creature” (qq. 5-6). Muslim and Jewish philosophers also failed to recognize that the extrinsic procession of creatures presupposes an internal procession of persons within God (q. 7; cf. Bonaventure, *Itinerarium* 6.2). Matthew ends his questions *De productione rerum* by noting how utterly different are creator and creature. Creation changes God not at all (q. 8), while in creatures it is so great a transformation that the very notion of an eternal creature or an eternal world is a contradiction in terms (q. 9).

Though he rejects mediate creation, in *De providentia* Matthew embraces a kind of mediate governance based on Dionysian hierarchy. “Thus I say indubitably that God rules and disposes, or administers, the whole of creation so that through mediating superiors he administers and rules inferiors, through more perfect mediators the less perfect, through the nobler the more ignoble, and what requires this is the nature of the good, the beauty and order of the universe, and his own perfection” (1956: 323). Hierarchy is set into the very nature of creation, from the arrangement of the heavens to the order within our souls, and humans have a duty to arrange their own institutions accordingly. There is an eternal law, upon which is founded the natural law, which in turn requires a written law. Each subsequent law depends upon the higher, prior law, and makes it more useful to ignorant, sinful men (1959: 443, 466, 486). Hierarchy is not a theoretical construct but forms the fundamental principle Matthew used to guide his stewardship of the Church.

Minister General of the Franciscans (May 1287–29 May 1289) Matthew took a conciliatory approach to the Spirituals. He rehabilitated Petrus Ioannis Olivi and John of Parma.
After the death of Pope Honorius IV (3 Apr. 1287), a divided conclave and the deaths of six cardinals in the summer heat brought the first Franciscan pope, Nicholas IV (22 Feb. 1288–4 Apr. 1292), who appointed Matthew Cardinal on 16 May 1288 and in 1291 named him Cardinal-Bishop of Porto. The “missionary Pope” sent Franciscans as far away as China, but in Rome Nicholas was subservient to the aristocratic Colonna family and lampooned as enclosed in a column (the Colonna symbol) with only his tiara and head showing. Under Nicholas, Matthew became penitentiary, a sensitive post which involved absolution of papal censures and granting of dispensations.

Upon the death of Nicholas IV the papal throne lay vacant for 27 months owing to a dispute between Orsini and Colonna cardinals. Finally, on 5 July 1294 Cardinal Latino Malabranca OP revealed that a saintly hermit, Pietro del Morrone, had prophesied divine retribution if the cardinals left the Church headless any longer. He proposed the hermit as pope and Matthew, along with the other cardinals, agreed, perhaps in hope that Celestine V would be the longed for “angel Pope” ushering in a new age of the Holy Spirit. It was not to be. Celestine recognized his own incapacity and on 13 Dec. 1294, in full consistory before Matthew and the other cardinals, he abdicated. This long crisis cemented the trust between Matthew and Matteo Caetani, elected Pope Boniface VIII on Christmas Eve, 1294.

Boniface’s pontificate split the two Franciscans he had met in Todi as a young canon. Jacopone wrote: “Behold, a new Lucifer on the papal throne,/ Poisoning the world with his blasphemies”, while Cardinal Matthew became Boniface’s chief lieutenant, playing the role he had seen Pecham perform so well for Bonaventure in Paris.

Boniface’s pontificate was marked by an ongoing dispute with King Philip IV (r. 1285-1314). The French called him “the Fair”, but in Matthew’s eyes he looked like Emperor Frederick II (d. 1250), who had espoused “the most dangerous of all [moral] errors”, namely, that “in every sect, whatever it believes and however it lives, salvation can be obtained as long as one does not violate its customary law”, the source of his insubordination to papal authority (1957a: 70, 77-8). Once Boniface chose Matthew as chief advisor and theoretician for papal
policies, it was almost inevitable that the dispute with Philip would rise to the level of first principles, where compromise quickly became impossible. This quarrel produced the finest scholastic writing on political theory—Giles of Rome, John of Paris, Dante—and created a political stand-off between Church and state. Humble but resolute, Matthew stood at the center of the whole dispute.

The conflict opened when Boniface asserted papal authority in *Clericus laicos* (24 Feb. 1296), to prevent taxation of the clergy. Philip replied by cutting off the Pope’s income from France, and Boniface backed down. After a lengthy process supervised by Matthew and two other cardinals, which generated “more codices than a mule could carry”, Boniface canonized Louis IX, Philip’s grandfather, on 11 July 1297, with Cardinal Matthew preaching.

Boniface was weakened in his fight with Philip by a dispute with the Colonna family, who joined with Spiritual Franciscans in Spring 1297, issuing a series of manifestos which began by questioning Boniface’s election and ended by accusing him of murdering Celestine V. Matthew lined up Franciscan support for Boniface, including Spirituals such as Olivi; on 14 Dec. 1297 he was made Papal legate; and on 20 Feb. 1298 he began preaching a crusade against the Colonnas, who surrendered by September 1298. Jacopone da Todi was clapped in jail, where he continued to inveigh against Boniface.

The first Jubilee year in papal history (1300), was declared in part to reassert papal authority. On Epiphany (6 Jan.), “Lord Matthew of Aquasparta preached, before the Pope and the cardinals, and before all, in the Church of St. John Lateran, that the Pope is the sovereign master (*sire*) over all things temporal and spiritual, whatever they are, in the place of God, by reason of the gift that God made to St. Peter, and to the Apostles after him” (Letter of the Flemish ambassadors, 17 Jan. 1300, in *Patrologia Latina* 185: 1901a). Matthew was made papal legate over Florence on 23 May 1300, finally entering the city on 15 Dec. 1301, from which he exiled Dante, among others (23 Jan. 1302).

By this time, the dispute had entered a new and deadly phase. On 24 Oct. 1301 Bernard Saisset, Bishop of Pamiers, was arrested, tried, and convicted in Philip’s presence, a direct
violation of canon law. Boniface replied on 5 Dec. 1301 with *Ausculta fili*: “Listen, son, to the commands of a father, heed the teaching of a master who holds on earth the place of Him who alone is Lord and Master”, and also commanded the French bishops to attend a council in Rome called for November, 1302. In response, Philip convened the first meeting of the Estates General at Paris, 10 Apr. 1302, where his advisor Pierre Flotte used forgeries to say that Boniface claimed feudal lordship over France. The nobility wrote to the Cardinals, the clergy to the Pope; and Philip’s envoys were received in full consistory on 24 June 1302, where Matthew replied for the Cardinals and Boniface in his own right.

In his address, Matthew took his theme from *Jeremiah* 1:10, which had become a proof text for papal power: “See I have set you this day over nations and over kingdoms, to pluck up and to break down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant”. This theme applied to Jeremiah and John the Baptist, but it “can be said more truly of Christ and his Vicar St. Peter and his successors the supreme Pontiffs” (1962b: 180). Matthew then developed a legal argument that includes a memorable comparison based on the story of Absalom, who tried to usurp David’s kingship with the connivance of Achitophel, the archetypal evil counselor. Boniface was like David, who held both spiritual and temporal power in Israel, Philip was like Absalom, led astray by Pierre Flotte, his Achitophel.

Matthew then began his theological argument on an impassioned, personal note: “So I stand for this truth, which I would dare to defend against the whole world and would dare to give my life: that the supreme Pontiff who is the vicar of St. Peter does have the plenitude of power” (1962b: 186). Three arguments in support of this conclusion followed.

“Christ, who was lord of the universe, bestowed his own power on Peter and his successors. Thus he said ‘Feed *my* sheep’—not these or those but *my* sheep, and ‘I give to you the keys to the kingdom of heaven’ (1962b: 186). These two Biblical texts argue from the universal extent of the Church’s authority, broader than any human power and symbolized by the keys, to the conclusion that all lesser powers must be subordinated to the one power of the Church. The reasoning is scholastic: a particular cause is subordinated to a universal cause. To try to avoid
the argument by denying the universality of ecclesiastical and therefore papal power is also to
deny “the Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins”, an article of the
Apostle’s Creed. *Unam Sanctam* would begin with this same article, as found in the Nicene
Creed.

As he customarily did in theology, Matthew followed with a purely rational argument:
“Even if you omit everything said thus far, I assume one [principle], that for everything in the
whole universe there is some one supreme thing”: one creator for the world, one father for each
family, one captain for each ship (1962b: 187). Deny this neoplatonic principle and you produce
disorder, making the community of God a two-headed monster. Matthew then reminded Philip’s
legates of Noah’s ark; inside there was one ruler–Noah himself–while the flood produced chaos
outside. The ark is a symbol of the Church, “the bark of Christ and Peter,” outside of which
there is no salvation. Since reason demands there be “one ruler and one head” for every
hierarchy, it follows that the one head–the Pope–“must be lord of all, temporal and spiritual, one
who has the plenitude of power” (187).

Matthew’s last argument addressed the temporal sword, for Matthew knew a letter had
been concocted by the King’s advisors putting in Philip’s mouth this insult to the Pope: “Let
your great fatuity know that in temporalities we are subject to none”. The Cardinal replied that
“jurisdiction” covers law and right (*de iure*), but also actions taken to enforce the law (*actus et
usus*). In spiritual matters, Christ gave to Peter and the supreme Pontiffs full jurisdiction in both
respects. The supreme Pontiff “can judge every temporal matter *in respect of sin*” or “*de iure*”,
but Jesus said to Peter, “put your sword back in its sheath” (*John* 18.11), which withdrew from
Peter and his successors the right of enforcement, but only enforcement. It does not follow that
Church and Pope have no jurisdiction at all. To say less would deny the Church’s right to judge
the moral character of human actions and consequently deny two fundamental articles of faith:
that Christ “will judge the living and the dead” and that the Church is “the communion of

Subsequent events proved just how perceptive was Matthew’s distinction. On 30 Oct.
1302, with only 36 of 78 French bishops attending, Boniface’s council opened, without Matthew, who had died the previous day. There is no documentary record on the cause of death, but it is humanly impossible not to think that the failure of his episcopal brothers to support the Pope must have helped bring down Matthew, then by all evidence at the height of his powers. Within the month came Unam sanctam, clearly Boniface’s tribute to his lieutenant and so close in style and substance to Matthew’s address of the previous June that the Cardinal must have had a hand in its drafting (1962b: 14*-23*). Bereft of Matthew’s advice and courage, Boniface succumbed to Philip’s next attack, dying on 11 Oct. 1303. Matthew’s tomb, by the school of John Cosmati, is found in the Franciscan Church of Aracoeli in Rome.

The Franciscan Chronica xxiv generalium described Matthew as “a man of great achievement (vir magnae sufficientiae)” (1935: xi), achievement that rests squarely on his conception of authority. In matters of theory, Matthew followed Bonaventure and Dionysius with the zeal of a disciple. But he also made use of the more ancient authority of Augustine to cap an argument or solidify a doctrine, though here one senses more institutional solidarity than love and conviction. The same distinction characterized Matthew’s practical life as a Cardinal. He was in awe of the institution of the Papacy and completely supported Pope Boniface’s claims to “plenitude of power”, supplying him with his best arguments, acting on his behalf, even preaching a crusade against the Colonnas. But one suspects Matthew was the instrument, not the disciple of Boniface. In practical life he was the disciple of only one human authority--the little plain man from Assisi. For Francis’s practical genius had kept his new and eccentric way of life doctrinally orthodox and on the right side of papal power, while his most fervent disciples, the Spirituals--not least among the crosses Cardinal Matthew had to bear–failed utterly in this regard.

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